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IAC-D-57/94
7 March 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 10-58:

Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,

dated 4 March 1958

1. On 4 March 1958 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the recommendations set forth in section III.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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7 March 1958Post-Mortem on NIE 10-58:Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,dated 4 March 1958.I. Findings

1. Since the preparation of NIE 10-55, there has been some increase in both the quantity and quality of resistance intelligence, particularly during 1956-57. This has permitted the Resistance Intelligence Committee to arrive at somewhat more detailed country studies for NIE 10-58 than was possible for NIE 10-55. However, the improvement is spotty and varies considerably from area to area. It is most pronounced in some Eastern European Satellites and least noticeable in the Far East.

2. Moreover, there remain vital gaps in resistance intelligence, largely because the most important information desired is of such nature that its collection presents considerable difficulties. This pertains particularly to intelligence required for specific operational exploitation of dissidence and for war planning purposes. On some questions, such as whether or not organized resistance groups exist, there is hardly any information at all. Other types of intelligence, coming from defectors, cannot in most cases be accepted at face value. Frequently conclusions in the country studies had to be based on area knowledge, available political, economic, and military intelligence, Communist publications, and combined expert opinions. The most valuable information on resistance came from Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, primarily as a result of the 1956 upheavals.

II. Major Intelligence Gaps

3. Even though it has been concluded that dissidence remains widespread throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc, assessment of the precise extent and degree of this dissidence continues to present difficult problems. There is need for considerable additional detailed intelligence on such key factors as:

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- a. Clandestine attempts at association among discontented elements, if only for the purpose of discussing ideas and grievances; also what is required to transform such shared dissidence into actual resistance.
- b. Key groups capable of initiating resistance activities or of contributing to existing potential. Among such groups are Party and governmental bureaucracy, intellectuals, university students and industrial workers, especially those in large factories.
- c. The possible effects of economic concessions by Communist regimes on resistance potential.
- d. The nature, location, size, resources and potential of such active resistance groups as still exist or may develop; the political aims and affinities of such groups.
- e. The resistance potential of ethnic minority groups, the extent of resistance potential and capabilities among important social groups, the morale of the armed forces, security control organizations, and their attitude toward resisters.
- f. The possible popular reaction to the use of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons in case of war.
- g. The impact of Soviet technological breakthroughs on popular attitudes, as they would affect resistance potential.

III. Recommendations

- 4. There remains a continuing requirement in the US Government for qualitatively and quantitatively adequate resistance intelligence. The military services have indicated that their planning requirements are unchanged. The operational agencies, especially CIA and USIA, are also continuing customers. It is therefore recommended that:

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a. The IAC agencies continue whatever efforts are feasible to expand detailed coverage on resistance activities and underlying bases of dissidence.

b. The RIC continue to review periodically the adequacy of intelligence and to amend the country studies as and when such revision is required.

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